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REWINDING SONY: THE EVOLVING
PRODUCT, PHONING HOME AND THE
DUTY OF ONGOING DESIGN
Randal C. Pickert
It has been clear for sometime that the Supreme Court would re-
visit its 1984 decision in Sony creating the famous (infamous?) "sub-
stantial noninfringing use" test for secondary liability for copyright
infringement. The only question was how the challenge would
emerge. Would it be a re-make of Sony with the digital video re-
corder playing the role of the VCR? Or would some other device
force its way on the stage? Of course, we now know that peer-to-peer
software has done just that and that the lower court decisions in Nap-
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ster, Aimster and finally Grokster have put these key issues before the
Court again.'
Much has changed during the intervening two decades. In 1984,
the video content industry feared that the VCR would destroy the way
in which broadcast television was financed by making it possible for
home viewers to skip over commercials. The industry saw only
dimly, if that, a possible future in which revenues for home viewing
of movies through tape rentals and purchases and now, of course,
from DVD rentals and sales would far exceed ticket revenues from
movie theaters.2
Now, in 2005, the video content industry fears that the DVR will
destroy the way in which broadcast television is financed by ... well,
perhaps things haven't changed so much after all. Of course the fact
that the video content industry was wrong the first time doesn't mean
that they are wrong this time.3 But there is a more basic change that
has taken place since Sony released the Betamax, and that change
matters enormously for how we should think about the regulation of
new products.
Product design was lumpy and episodic when Sony created the Be-
tamax and the products were lumpy too. By that, I mean that (i) a
product would come with a well-defined set of features; (ii) once a
particular VCR was sold, the features of that VCR would remain un-
changed forever; and (iii) this created an installed base of products
that had to be taken into account in considering changes to future
versions of the VCR, which of course constrained how the VCR
could evolve.
We are at a very different point now. Most interesting products
that you don't eat come with software and indeed, the feature set of
the product is defined in many ways by that software. The zero mar-
ginal cost feature of software means that there are no natural bounda-
ries to define the features of the product.4 But software alone isn't
sufficient to break the lumpy design framework. We need to combine
I Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003), cert. denied sub nom., Deep v. Recording Industry Ass'n of Am., 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), aff d, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th
Cir. 2002).
2 See Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 288-91 (2003).
3 For my views on the implications of the DVR, see Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video
Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205 (2004).
4 Elsewhere I have called these "scope-of-permission" goods and have considered how
antitrust law should deal with the fundamental arbitrariness of product definition for this class of
products. See Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We
Invest in Reducing Entry Barriers?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV 189 (2005).
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software with communication-networked products-and now we
have products that can evolve in real-time (and do).5 Design ceases to
be a one-time event and instead becomes a continuous process. And
that is true not only for the next product sold, but also for the entire
installed base. The dead hand of the past and the constraints of back-
wards compatibility are lifted.
How does this matter as the Supreme Court reconsiders Sony?
Those who fear any step back from the substantial noninfringing use
6test believe that it is essential for protecting innovation incentives.
The core fight over Sony turns on the uncertainty of what happens
next: what is the next use of the product not seen today? But Sony is
framed in the context of episodic design with an installed-base con-
straint and no real possibility of feedback between actual use of the
product and design.
We are at a very different point now. Networked products evolve
and we are now going to frame what ongoing design obligations
should exist with regard to these networked products. Smart products
"phone home" and update themselves. Phoning home-and the con-
trol that results from that-is a choice. Sony had no good way to
control the Betamax after it was unleashed on the world. Sony
couldn't pull the plug on the Betamax, either physically or virtually.
Sony couldn't issue a 100%-effective electronic recall of the Be-
tamax. But if the designers of Grokster lack ongoing control over
their product, it is because they consciously chose to relinquish con-
trol. They could have evolved the product and done so not in think-
ing about potential uses of the product, but in light of actual use, in
light of actual realization of the unanticipated next use. Sony
couldn't do that with the Betamax.
This means that it is a mistake to focus on all-or-nothing, thumbs-
up/thumbs-down tests for evaluating networked products like the
DVR or peer-to-peer networking. We need to focus on the process of
5 And, to continue the litany of self-cites, I have examined the consequences of network-
ing for product design before in considering whether Microsoft should have been found to
violate the Sherman Act for bundling Internet Explorer with Windows. See Randal C. Picker,
Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a Net-
worked World, 158 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 113 (2002). I also consider the dark side of
networked products-what the zombification of PCs means for cybersecurity-in Randal C.
Picker, Cybersecurity: Of Heterogenity and Autarky, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CYBERSECURITY (Mark Grady & Francesoco Parisi eds., forthcoming 2005). In that paper, I
also address what the possibility of continuous design means for timing decisions about when to
release software (earlier rather than later). Id.
6 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Computer Science Professors Harold Abelson et. al,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (No. 04-480) available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-vGrokster/2005030l-cs-profs.pdf.
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product evolution, the choices that designers make regarding their
ability to evolve the product in light of evolving use and who should
have a stake in controlling that evolution.
This paper has four sections. Section I lays out some of the criti-
cism of Sony and offers a quick overview of the recent caselaw on
peer-to-peer software. Section II offers examples of evolving net-
worked products and the choices that are being made today about
whether effective control is maintained over the product even after its
initial distribution (phoning home). Some of our hottest products
today-including TiVo and the Apple iPod-fall into this category.
Section III considers how technology has altered the set of effective
legal rights in sound recordings, the costs and benefits of that, and the
innovation safe harbor created by Sony's substantial noninfringing
use test. Finally, Section IV sets forth an alternative test. The test is
keyed to whether ongoing control is or is not retained over the net-
worked product. Relinquishing control should result in a test tougher
than that set forth in Sony; retaining control should kick in the sub-
stantial noninfringing use test, but that would be coupled with a duty
of ongoing design to reduce noninfringing use. I then consider three
situations in which we have attempted to design systems to minimize
copyright infringement (the Napster injunction process; the notice-
and-takedown regime applicable to Internet service providers under
Section 512 of the Copyright Act; and the FCC's broadcast flag proc-
ess for digital television).
I. THE STATE OF SONY
While technology has been racing forward for twenty years, the
law remains mired in the goop. Sony was a tightly-contested 5-4 de-
cision, in which the internal workings of the Supreme Court were
sufficiently fluid, as Paul Goldstein tells it,7 that the Court held the
case over to be re-argued and still flip-flopped between different ma-
jority opinions. The internal history of the Sony opinion makes con-
crete the fundamental ambivalence that the Court faced-and that we
still face-about the right way to frame the test in this situation.
At the initial conference among the justices discussing the case,
Justice Blackmun was assigned the task of writing a majority opinion
in favor of the copyright holders. During the back-and-forth of opin-
ion writing, Justice Brennan shifted his views. He had concluded that
it was a mistake to consider the VCR under a "primary use" test and
instead thought that the VCR should be evaluated on whether it had a
7 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 119-28 (rev. ed. Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1994).
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"substantial noninfringing use."8 That was the language the Court
used in framing what has become to be known as the Sony test:
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance
between the copyright holder's legitimate demand for effec-
tive-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory mo-
nopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of com-
merce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
poses. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial non-
infringing uses. 9
Twenty years later, where do we stand? The defenders of Sony char-
acterize its test as the Magna Carta of product innovation and hope
that the test will survive the Grokster appeal intact. And what do the
the motion picture studios and recording companies, petitioners in the
Supreme Court, seek? In their merits brief before the Supreme Court,
they argue that Sony should be read to say that the staple article of
commerce doctrine doesn't apply "when the primary or principal use
of a product or service is infringing."' 0 Twenty years have passed,
and we are exactly where the Supreme Court was in the beginning,
choosing between "primary use" and the "substantial noninfringing
use" safe harbor.
A. The Chilly Sixth Floor
The Sony test has been criticized on a number of grounds, and the
test may have received its chilliest reception on the sixth floor of the
University of Chicago Law School. So I argued in 2002 that the sub-
stantial noninfringing use test did a poor job of aligning costs and
benefits associated with a new product. The substantial noninfringing
use test does create a safe harbor so that a product designer can be
sure that she doesn't face liability, but it does so at the cost of allow-
ing products that are, on net, wildly socially harmful to proliferate.
Moreover, I emphasized that the Sony test failed to create any design
incentives, even in circumstances where a redesign would be incredi-
8 Id. at 124.
9 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
"0 Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners, at 31, Metro-
Goldwn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted 125
S. Ct. 686 (2004) (No 04-480), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-vGrokster/04-
480_Petitioners-brief.pdf.
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bly cost-efficient." Two of my sixth-floor colleagues, Doug Licht-
man and Bill Landes, jumped on Sony in 2003 and found "much to
criticize in the Court's analysis."' 2 They emphasized how even small
design changes in the VCR-the precision of the fast-forward button,
for example-might have protected copyright holders without pre-
venting legitimate uses. 13
Finally, and most importantly, in June, 2003, my part-time sixth-
floor colleague Judge Posner issued his opinion in Aimster. That
opinion addressed both the net costs and benefits issue and the de-
sign-incentives issue. On the former, the Seventh Circuit tried to
tease out of Sony the possibility that some sort of balancing of in-
fringing and noninfringing uses was possible.' 4  On the latter, the
Seventh Circuit addressed directly whether Aimster had an obligation
to design its product to minimize infringing uses:
Even when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet file-
sharing service, moreover, if the infringing uses are substan-
tial then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the pro-
vider of the service must show that it would have been dis-
proportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce
substantially the infringing uses.
15
This sensible design test has been criticized for being outside the
scope of Sony, 16 but that isn't obviously right. While Justice Black-
mun did consider the possibility of alternative designs for the VCR,
17
the majority opinion ignored the design issues. We shouldn't make
too much of that silence.
1 Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 444-45 (2002).
The design issue makes the point even more powerful. You could spend $5 to design
the product to eliminate the social harm while still creating $100 in social benefits.
Should you spend the money to redesign? Again, the answer should be straightfor-
ward and with a sensible liability rule, would be. In contrast, Sony removes any rea-
son to redesign to minimize copyright infringement.
Id.
12 Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liabilityfor Copyright Infringement: An
Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 395, 400 (2003).
13 Id.
14 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649 ("What is true is that when a supplier is offering a product or
service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magni-
tudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement.").
'5 Id. at 653.
16 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement With-
out Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1362 (2004).
17 Sony, 464 U.S. at 494 ("Sony may be able, for example, to build a VTR that enables
broadcasters to scramble the signal of individual programs and 'jam' the unauthorized recording
of them.").
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B. Meanwhile, in California...
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Aimster followed up on the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Napster. Napster ran a "centralized" peer-
to-peer service for distributing music. That meant that Napster pro-
vided a centralized index indicating what music was available for
download, but Napster itself hosted no music and all downloading
took place between peers. The Napster opinion addressed whether
the downloading itself could be framed as legitimate fair use, a criti-
cal issue given that the recording industry was seeking to hold Nap-
ster liable as a secondary infringer, that is, an infringer who makes
possible some other person's primary infringement. But the Ninth
Circuit saw no basis for overturning the lower court's opinion on fair
use 8 and that allowed the Ninth Circuit to turn to the questions of
secondary liability and Sony.
The Ninth Circuit found that Napster could be held liable, and that
was interesting. The simple opinion would have held the other way
and would have tracked Sony woodenly. Was Napster capable of
substantial noninfringing uses? Sure. Napster could be used for peer-
to-peer distribution of any content and there is lots of public domain
content (U.S. governmental works being a key category). Even
within the domain of music, some bands were happy to have their
music distributed virally through peer-to-peer networks. This could
be a great way for a band to capture an audience outside of the stan-
dard hierarchical system for distributing music that dominates the
record industry.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis saw Napster as having knowledge of
infringement through the control that Napster could exert over its
system: "[t]he record supports the district court's finding that Napster
has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available
using its system, that it could block access to the system by suppliers
of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material.,' 9
The Ninth Circuit side-stepped Sony by ignoring the current design of
Napster and instead focusing on what Napster could be, its could-
have-been design. In the context of the case, we might think of that as
the distinction between a product, such as the VCR, and a service,
what Napster effectively was, though, as I have indicated already, I
think the more important point conceptually is that Napster was a
networked product.
18 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
'9 Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit emphasized Napster's ongoing obligations to
police its network in its consideration of whether Napster could be
held liable under the secondary liability doctrine of vicarious liability:
Here, plaintiffs have demonstrated that Napster retains the
right to control access to its system. Napster has an express
reservation of rights policy .... To escape imposition of vi-
carious liability, the reserved right to police must be exer-
cised to its fullest extent. Turning a blind eye to detectable
acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liabil-
ity .... The district court correctly determined that Napster
had the right and ability to police its system and failed to ex-
ercise that right to prevent the exchange of copyrighted mate-
rial.2"
In mid-2004, the Ninth Circuit revisited the status of peer-to-peer
distribution networks in its decision in Grokster. The court recog-
nized that "the software design [was] of great import," 21 in particular,
a key switch from Napster in the way that indices were maintained
and the corresponding control that resulted for the network creator.
Napster was distinguished as a p2p network with central indexing,
Grokster and its cousins as decentralized "supernode" networks.22
Grokster was seen as lacking the direct involvement that an ISP might
have or the ongoing role that Napster had:
"Failure" to alter software located on another's computer is
simply not akin to the failure to delete a filename from one's
own computer, to the failure to cancel the registration name
and password of a particular user from one's user list, or to
the failure to make modifications to software on one's own
computer.23
In similar fashion, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that Grokster
should be found to be liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability:
"[w]e agree with the district court that possibilities for upgrading soft-
ware located on another person's computer are irrelevant to determin-
ing whether vicarious liability exists. 24
20 Id. at 1023 (citations omitted).
21 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
22 Id. at 1158-59.
23 Id. at 1163-64.
24 Id. at 1166 (citations omitted).
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II. THE EVOLVING PRODUCT: PHONING HOME AND THE DUTY OF
ONGOING DESIGN
I think that the Ninth Circuit's core conception in Grokster is
wrong. It depends on nonexistent vision of the difference between
sins of omission and commission. It also ignores the new realities of
networked products and what those should mean for ongoing design
obligations.
Networked products can evolve. These are products with the pos-
sibility of communication and strong software components. Most
importantly for the current discussion, this category includes the digi-
tal video recorder-TiVo being the most prominent brand-and peer-
to-peer software resident on a personal computer. Consider three
quick examples of evolving networked products:
* Google Desktop Search. The current fight for the com-
puter desktop is over search capability. The problem is that it
is easier to find a file on the Internet than it is on your own
computer. The solution? A number of leading and not-so-
leading companies have new programs; Google's is Google
Desktop Search (GDS) and you get it by downloading it from
Google's website. In December, 2004, computer science re-
searchers at Rice University discovered a security flaw in
GDS that would have made it possible for third parties to in-
vade the privacy of GDS users. Did GDS users need to go to
Google's website to download a patch for their software?
No. GDS automatically updates itself-it evolves on its own
without any action by the consumer. The capabilities of the
software sitting on your computer change without even hav-
ing to click the mouse.25
* Windows. Microsoft Windows updates as well.26 Win-
dows is a complex product and is a prominent target for
hackers, so security updates are important. The visibility of
the update process depends on your settings, but on my com-
puter, the updates are quietly downloaded in the background,
without any initiation by me. A window pops open to let me
know that updates are ready for installation; I click and in-
stall.
25 See Scarlet Pruitt, Security Hole Found in Google Desktop Search, IDG News Service,
Dec. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/12/20/HNholeingoogle 1.html.
26 Visit windowsupdate.microsoft.com for more information.
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* TiVo. The digital video recorder is a classic networked
product. The DVR is just a souped-up VCR, but the soup
matters. The DVR uses a hard disk to store copied programs
and so users need not put in a blank tape when they want to
record a favored program. That would be a step forward over
the VCR, but combine that with software to make recording
easier, and now we have a worthy machine. The recording
software simplifies programming and can even automate that
process to record all of the episodes of your favorite show.
To make that work, your TiVo phones home periodically to
download the new TV schedule. To be mechanical, this
means that the TiVo in your family room is hooked up to the
phone line and dials to a TiVo server somewhere for the new
information. But, and now we head to controversy, TiVo also
downloads the software that controls its operation. TiVo cen-
tral has recently propagated a software change through the
network of TiVos to embed in your TiVo a copy protection
scheme from Macrovision.27 From the consumer's stand-
point, this means that the TiVo box in your living room is los-
ing functionality, as you will lose the ability to record certain
programs in your preferred way. You bought one box; it had
certain capabilities but those features evolve as part of the
TiVo service.
These are just three easy examples, but we could multiply this list
many times over. Apple controversially "updated" its iPod software
so that iPod owners could not play songs from RealNetworks's online
music store (Apple thinks that you are supposed to buy your songs at
its iTunes website).28  That raises some delicious antitrust
questions-should we think of this as a technological refusal to
deal?-but more to the current point is just that Apple could do that if
it wanted to do so. To take another example, anti-virus software is
more service than software: anti-virus software that didn't evolve
would be worthless, so the software routinely updates to deal with
new threats. But the software doesn't update forever: the software is
an annual subscription and while you can keep the old software and
its protection against old viruses without having to buy a new sub-
scription, you instantly lose protection against new viruses.
27 See Lucas Graves, Has TiVo Forsaken Us?, WIRED MAG., Nov. 2004, at 150.
28 See John Borland, Apple fights RealNetworks' "hacker tactics," Cnet News.com, Dec.
14, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2102-1027_3-5490604.html; for lively commentary,
see the byplay between James Boyle and Thomas Hazlett, The Apple of forbidden knowledge,
Fr.com, Aug 12, 2004, excerpt available at http://www.musicfreedomofchoice.org.
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In all of these cases, we have a product with a strong software
component and ongoing communication with the mothership. This is
a design choice and one made possible by the spread of cheap com-
munications, machine intelligence and storage. Networked product
evolution is going to put pressure on law. Do TiVo users have a dis-
abled product cause of action against TiVo when the next software
upgrade reduces the functionality of TiVo? That will obviously de-
pend on the license agreements in place between TiVo and its cus-
tomers and the nature of notice that is required to customers.29
Consider the phoning home capability. As this list should make
clear, the producer of a networked product chooses whether or not to
have ongoing contact with the product. Put differently, the producer
chooses whether or not to create the possibility of future control of
the product. For some products, this control is wholly natural. A
disconnected TiVo or anti-virus software is worth very little. Both
products have a natural obsolescence-new viruses and new pro-
grams arise and the products need to be updated to continue to be
effective-that necessitates ongoing contact and that contact creates
an easy opportunity for forcing other changes, such as TiVo's recent
change regarding Macrovision's encryption technology.
In other cases, the electronic tether is critical to the business
model. Napster has gone legit with its Napster To Go service. Its ads
poke fun at the iPod and iTunes's 99¢ a song pricing noting that you
could spend $10,000 to fill up your'iPod. Napster just wants $15 and
will hand over a million songs. The catch? Napster is a music rental
service; it's $15 a month forever, and if you don't pay the $15 some
month, your MP3 player can no longer play any of the songs stored
on it. Napster To Go requires monthly renewal and your downloaded
songs will die without it.
30
In other products, the control is more obviously a choice. Google
Desktop Search automatically updates-it just does it-no questions
asked.3' And, similar to Napster To Go, software can easily build-in
29 And we are already starting to see consumer litigation when product features are dis-
abled. See Christopher Rhoads, Cellphone Users Sue, Saying Carrier Cut Phone's Features,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at BI (alleging that Verizon disabled phone's native Bluetooth
wireless technology to direct more traffic to its wireless network).
30 See Wilson Rothman, Music Buffet: Loading Up for Takeout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2005, at El; Walter S. Mossberg, 'Napster To Go' Offers Alternative to iTunes-If You Keep On
Paying, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at B1.
3! See Google's website for an explanation of how Google Desktop Search automatically
updates itself:
Automatic Updates. Google Desktop Search may communicate with Google's serv-
ers to check for available updates to the software, such as bug fixes, patches, en-
hanced functions, missing plug-ins and new versions (collectively, "Updates"). Dur-
ing this process, Google Desktop Search sends Google a request for the latest version
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obsolescence, by giving the software an expiration date and thereby a
limited life. 32 Once the software has stopped working, the end-user is
forced to download new software if she wants to continue to use it,
and that software can upgrade or downgrade the user's experience. 33
There is little reason to believe that the private incentive for ongo-
ing control will match with the possible social costs and benefits.
Grokster is a good example of this. The Napster decision offered a
roadmap for software designers seeking to limit their potential liabil-
ity as secondary infringers. Don't be at the center of the p2p network
and be sure not to have any ability to police the network. Intention-
ally relinquish control over the software.
The actual facts of Grokster are fuzzy on the extent of control re-
tained by the software producer. Grokster and StreamCast were both
defendants in the Grokster litigation. Both based their p2p software
on the FastTrack software developed by KaZaa BV, a Dutch com-
pany. (KaZaa subsequently transferred control over FastTrack to
Sharman Networks.) A dispute arose between StreamCast and Ka-
Zaa, and StreamCast switched from FastTrack to software that
StreamCast created from the open-source p2p software Gnutella. In
the course of that dispute, a FastTrack software upgrade was propa-
gated throughout the Grokster and KaZaa user bases, and the conse-
quence of that was to cut off StreamCast users from access to the
Grokster and KaZaa networks.34
It is precisely this ability to propagate changes to products that is
at stake in Grokster. The defendants wanted to disclaim control when
information. By installing the Google Desktop Search, you hereby agree to auto-
matically request and receive Updates from Google's servers.
Google Desktop Search Terms and Conditions at http://desktop.google.com/eula.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2005).
32 See, e.g., RealNetworks's discussions of this for its beta software, Has Your Beta Ex-
pired?, at http://service.real.com/help/faq/betaexp.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
33 Both of these possibilities-automatic updates of the sort seen with Google Desktop
Search or built-in software expiration with required renewal for continuing
functioning-suggest that software designers can force updates. That makes it hard to under-
stand some claims to the contrary. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Computer Science Profes-
sors Harold Abelson et al., supra note 6, at 14.
Even assuming that Respondents have the right and ability to deliver such software
to end users, there can be no way to ensure that software updates are installed, and
stay installed. End users ultimately have control over which software is on their
computers. If an end user does not want a software update, there is no way to make
her take it.
Id.
Of course, a consumer could remove her computer from the network completely and avoid
updates, but you can't search the Internet off the network and you can't download the next great
song offline either. And going offline would not prevent expiration of time-limited software.
34 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1159 n.5.
[Vol. 55:4
REWINDING SONY
in fact a modicum of control was retained. More importantly, how
much control was retained was just a design choice, and one that
might be made to limit potential legal liability. And we should note
how different this is from Sony. As the Seventh Circuit made clear in
Aimster, the Sony Court was unwilling to attempt to "demix" infring-
ing and noninfringing uses "because once Sony sold the recorder it
,,35lost all control over its use.
We should be nervous about this. We need to regard the choice
about how and whether a product evolves as being one of the central
decisions that arises in product design. This is much like viruses and
antidotes: you shouldn't build a virus if you can't build and distribute
the antidote. We could regard a product that doesn't phone home as
having been recklessly isolated. We should think of this as an inten-
tional relinquishment of control. The manufacturer has set a process
into motion and has willfully chosen to tie its hands so as to avoid any
subsequent control over events.
We recall physical products with some frequency. So go to the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission website 36 and see
whether your car has been recalled. You know how this works: you
get a letter in the mail from your car manufacturer asking you to bring
in your car so that something can be fixed, which they assure you,
really wouldn't be a problem at all were it not for the government's
finickiness with regard to safety. We have the ability to recall elec-
tronically networked products and the only question is whether we are
going to create the right incentives for producers to design mecha-
nisms to recall these products automatically.
III. WHAT IS AT STAKE?
We should step back and figure out what we are trying to accom-
plish. The p2p technology that has given us Napster, Aimster, and
Grokster has put enormous pressure first on the music business, and
soon-probably--on video as new approaches to file sharing, such as
BitTorrent, speed up downloading. But we shouldn't fret about
major changes in how an industry is organized. That inevitably is
wrenching for the people most directly involved, but we accept this as
the natural process of destruction and creation in a capitalist econ-
omy. If online distribution of music is really vastly cheaper than
35 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648.
36 http://www.cpsc.gov/.
37 See Clive Thompson, The BitTorrent Effect, WIRED MAG., Jan. 2005, at 151; Sarah
McBride, Film Industrv Vows Crackdown on Online Movie Thieves, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2004,
at B 1.. See also Kevin Werbach, The Implications of Video P2P on Network Usage, in VIDEO
PEER TO PEER (forthcoming, 2005).
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physical distribution of CDs-and it easily could be38 -we should
want the old means of distribution to die, just as the car replaced the
horse and buggy.
Instead, we should focus on three issues: (1) the determinants of
the effective scope of rights in sound recordings; (2) whether focusing
on the balance of infringing and noninfringing uses captures the is-
sues that we should care about in defining those rights; and (3) the
benefits of creating an innovation safe harbor.
A. The Scope of Effective Rights in Sound Recordings
Before Napster, technology ensured the core one-to-one match be-
tween the physical CD and the use of the music. Sure, you could
share a CD with your friends or make a copy using a tape recorder of
some sort, but the transaction costs and imperfections of all of this
limited sharing of CDs, either through physical transfer or through
copying. Obviously, Napster changed all of that and destroyed the
assumption that the sale of a CD put one copy of the music into one
person's hands.
The business model of the industry was based on this one-to-one
match. But that match also tracked the rights model of the law: copy-
right rightfully distinguishes ownership of the physical CD from
ownership of the copyright, and ownership of the CD doesn't give the
possessor any right to make or distribute copies of the music. 39 Prior
to Napster, copyrights in the sound recordings were meaningfully
enforceable, because the technology didn't make large-scale viola-
tions possible. With Napster and its successors, a single act of public
access-sale of a CD or even playing a song on the radio-makes
possible widespread distribution without regarding to the rights of the
copyright holder.
The question is what to do in response to this technological shift,
which, without a further response, has greatly shrunk the effective
rights of the copyright holder. We could simply acquiesce in this
18 For further discussion, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY,
LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004).
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2004) (governing the right "to reproduce the work in copies or
phonorecords"); § 106(3) (governing the right to distribute same). See also § 202:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is dis-
tinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer
of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the
work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work em-
bodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership
of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in
any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2004).
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change in effective rights and hope that copyright creators can make
enough money elsewhere through touring and T-shirt sales or have
sufficiently other strong reasons to want to create.40 But a market for
live music has always existed and the real question is the size of the
net shift in revenues that will result if sound recordings can no longer
be sold and whether such a shift is a good thing or a bad thing.
Or we can look for approaches to putting the fear of God into end-
user downloaders.4 The standard deterrence story calculates ex-
pected punishments based on the probability of getting caught and
prosecuted times the resulting punishment. Depending on our tastes,
we can play with both sides of that, putting additional resources into
pursuing end-users-both the RIAA and the MPAA have done
that-and thereby increasing the probability of detection. We can
boost penalties too, though much of the current discussion of the
statutory penalties for copyright violation argues that those penalties
are already too high.
And copyright holders will take steps to protect themselves too, to
take a variety of measures of self-help. The movement towards
digital rights management (DRM) is one of, at a minimum, restoring
the core one-to-one relationship we saw with physical CDs: one CD,
one copy and one end-user. DRM seeks to restore the control over
copies that naturally came with the limited opportunities defined by
the offline environment of the world of physical CDs. To be sure, it
may do more than that as well, as DRM makes possible more finely-
grained control and a possible broad shift from a model of ownership
and zero marginal cost per use to rental and per-use charges.
B. Assessing Infringing and Noninfringing Uses
While we might choose to calibrate our copyright tests in terms of
the extent of infringing and noninfringing uses-as Sony does and as
the record companies and movie studios would have us do in Grok-
ster-those metrics don't immediately match to social benefits and
harms. The focus on infringing and noninfringing uses is just how
copyright keeps score, but there is a big gap between this scorekeep-
ing and the issues that we actually care about.
The copying of copyrighted works usefully forces us to consider
the virtues and vices of ordinary theft of physical goods and then to
40 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 269-70 (2002).
41 Lemley & Reese, supra note 16 (discussing various alternatives to suing copyright in-
fringers).
42 This concept is discussed in greater detail in Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds
to Self-Help, I J. L. ECON. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2005).
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work our way back to unauthorized copying of intangible works. So
consider the theft of a bushel of apples from my back yard. Stealing
the apples just transfers the apples from me to the thief, but the apples
themselves remain as before and so social wealth appears unchanged.
But there are two key problems with this theft. First, we have no
assurance that the apples are moving to someone who values the ap-
ples more than those apples were valued by me. The thief may value
the apples at $1 while I value the apples at $10, and, if so, the transfer
reduces wealth by $9. Of course, you might say, it is just as likely
that the thief values the apples at $10, while I value them at $1, so we
can't say anything sharp about the involuntary transfer.
But we can say something more precise if we compare involuntary
transfer to voluntary transfer. So suppose that I consider swapping
the apples for a bunch of bananas. If I value the apples more than the
bananas, the voluntary transfer doesn't take place. If my potential
trading party values the bananas more than the apples, the transfer
doesn't take place. The deal only happens if we both prefer the trade
over the status quo, and in that case, we know society is better off
from the trade. Voluntary transactions should be wealth
enhancing-relative to the status quo-while involuntary transfers of
physical goods lack any such presumption.
Now for the second point. When property can be stolen, we will
see investments relating to the possibility of theft by both the owner
and the thief. The owner will invest to protect the property, and the
thief will invest to overcome the owner's protective steps. Both sides
can spend substantial resources and yet the risk of theft may be com-
pletely unaltered. In the absence of easily enforced state-defined
property rights, parties will invest resources to create their own prop-
erty rights.
Contrast physical property with intangible property. The first
point changes while the second continues to bite. As to the latter,
absent meaningful legal protections for intangible property, we will
see measures and countermeasures relating to the protection of that
property, just as we saw with physical property.
But the transfer analysis is quite different. If I copy a song from
your CD, you continue to have the song as well. Holding everything
else constant, my copy of the song creates more use of the song and
that raises social welfare. The record companies will talk about lost
profits and lost sales and the academics can see if they can quantify
that claim, but whatever the empirical results actually are on that,
nonconsensual use is an increase in use and that is a social good.4 3
43 Recent empirical work includes: Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction
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Put this way, this is an exercise in price discrimination similar to sell-
ing hard-bound and paperback books. Some customers buy the song
on a CD or through an online music service such as iTunes. Others
users download the song for nothing through a p2p network.
We can identify two natural sources of harm here. One is the re-
duced number of creations that artists will make if artists cannot hold
a property right in their work. A second source of harm is the re-
sources that, say, record companies and artists will invest to create
their own property rights in the absence of meaningfully enforceable
legal property rights. This is the war of attrition idea: I spend re-
sources to protect my rights and you spend resources to invade them,
and so it goes. But the nonconsensual use of the music itself is not a
harm, and indeed, it may be a benefit of p2p technology.
C. The Sony Test as Innovation Safe Harbor
The great virtue of Sony's substantial noninfringing use test is that
it creates an innovation safe harbor. And it does so in a context where
we could reasonably fear that we will find it difficult to coordinate
innovation over time. Consider a two-stage innovation. The first-
stage creator can't participate in second stage benefits-assume diffi-
culties of coordination and negotiations-but assume that the first
stage is essential to have the second stage development. Frame this
innovation as having first-stage social benefits of B 1 and social harms
of HI and second-stage social benefits of B2 and social harms of H2.
If the applicable legal rule forces the first-stage innovator to internal-
ize all the harm, she will move forward if B 1 > H I and not otherwise.
But socially we want her to move forward if B 1 + B2 > HI + H2. We
will want to move forward as a society but won't do so given the pri-
vate incentives if a disproportionate amount of the net social benefit
appears at the second stage and can't be captured by the first-stage
mover.
The Sony test avoids this problem for the innovator, as the test ef-
fectively just looks to the size of B 1. At the same time, the Sony test
or Just Plain Destruction? (Working Paper Dec. 2004) available at
http://som.utdallas.edu/capri/destruction.pdf; Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect
of File Sharing on Record Sales An Empirical Analysis (Working Paper Mar. 2004) available at
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March2004.pdf; Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel,
Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a
Sample of College Students (Working Paper Sept. 30, 2004) available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/polk/dropbox/waldfogel.pdf; and Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the
Effect of Music Downloads on Music Sales (Working Paper) available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/polk/dropbox/zertner.pdf.
2005]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
never confronts the question of whether the sum of the benefits of the
two stages of innovation exceeds the sum of the costs. That is its
central problem, and the question is whether we can do better than
Sony. I think we can.
IV. A NEW TEST FOR NETWORKED PRODUCTS
We should modify the Sony test of substantial noninfringing use
and replace it with a more textured test that reflects the control and
evolution opportunities available with networked products.
In some sense, the design point and the current mix of uses are
orthogonal issues. Here is what I mean by that. My prior criticism
of the Sony test emphasized that the test created no incentives to
design a product to eliminate infringing uses." So long as the
product is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, the producer
of the product avoids third-party liability. The extent of infringing
uses is irrelevant as is the question of whether the product could
have been designed to minimize infringing uses.
But suppose that we replaced the Sony test with a primary use
test, stating that a producer avoided third-party liability if the pri-
mary use of the product was noninfringing. What are the design
incentives then? The producer has the incentive to eliminate addi-
tional infringing uses only at the tipping point between liability
and non-liability. If the product has a sufficiently large set of non-
infringing uses, then again the producer has no reason to reduce
infringing uses, even if it would be cost-effective to do so.
The real question is just that: is it cost-effective to reduce in-
fringing uses? That question exists independent of whatever mix
of infringing and noninfringing uses will result from the currently-
designed product. To be extreme, imagine a product that will cre-
ate $10 million worth of beneficial noninfringing uses and only
$100 in harmful infringing uses. This is a wonderful product. But
if we could spend $5 for a modified design that would keep the
same benefits while eliminating the harmful infringing uses, we
should do so.
So Sony does a poor job with design incentives. Under its test,
altering the extent of infringing uses has nothing to do with
whether the producer will face liability for the product. A primary
use test would do somewhat better but only in the zone of altering
liability. The test would create no design incentives for a product
outside of that zone, such as my $10 million product in the last
44 Picker, supra note 11, at 444-45.
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paragraph. Given all of that, what role should a use test play if it
bears little relationship to the design inquiry?
The use test matters for determining whether to release a prod-
uct in the first place. As discussed in Section III.C. above, Sony
creates a safe harbor for product release and there could be cir-
cumstances where we think that having such a safe harbor is sensi-
ble. That really depends on how frequently you think the particu-
lar conditions described above occur. The mistake is to treat the
existence of that question as dispositive of the question of whether
the producer should have an original design obligation to minimize
infringing uses or, now with networked products, an ongoing de-
sign obligation to do so.
A. The New Test
The new test should be a conditional test:
I f the producer chooses to let go of the product so that the
producer cannot exercise control going forward and therefore
cannot evolve the product in response to actual use, the pro-
ducer should face a hard use test. I haven't spent much time
thinking about whether that should be framed as "primary
use," "dominant use," "predominant use" or something else.
There are obviously differences there--certainly between the
first formulation and the second and third-but those differ-
ences aren't my focus here. Given the $10 million example
set forth above, we should probably couple that with an inde-
pendent obligation to take sensible design steps to eliminate
infringing uses.
* If instead the producer ensures that the product can phone
home so that updates can be promulgated throughout the sys-
tem for the networked product., the producer should face a
substantial noninfringing use test, coupled with the duty to
evolve the product to eliminate infringing uses. "Eliminate"
is quite strong, of course, so this could be framed instead in a
number of ways, say, "eliminate infringing uses when it is
cost-effective to do so" or "eliminate [the majority/the pre-
dominant number] of infringing uses." As to the evolution
duty, note that Section 512 of the Copyright Act creates a
version of this for Internet service providers and that frame-
work provides a natural starting point. And the litigation in
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Napster itself offers another look at product evolution. Both
of these turn on a notice-and-takedown mechanism.
We should start by getting rid of one bogey, namely, rejecting any
test that the VCR itself would have failed. We need to be careful
about retrospective curve-fitting. As I have emphasized, for the prod-
ucts of interest, the core control and evolution properties have
changed. Sony couldn't evolve the installed base of VCRs and would
always be constrained by the installed base for any possible changes
in the product going forward. Cheap communications, storage and
machine intelligence have made the world in which the VCR was
launched the world of yesterday. We shouldn't build a test that
doesn't match the opportunities of the times.
As to the suggested test itself, a couple of points are important. As
to the first part of the test, I continue to think that the Court was
wrong to embrace the substantial noninfringing use test in Sony,as
taking as a given copyright's scorekeeping system of infringing and
noninfringing uses. As Section III.B. above suggests, we should be
skeptical about that scheme, and perhaps we should understand Sony
itself as embracing that skepticism in adopting the substantial nonin-
fringing use test. But we should address the problems with the use
tests directly, and hence I continue to believe that if a product has to
be evaluated as is, on a one-time basis-as we will do if the poten-
tially networked product has been disconnected and won't phone
home for updates-we should apply a more stringent test, such as one
that finds contributory infringement if the primary use of the product
is infringing.
But we need not live with a single point-in-time evaluation of the
product, and should not if the producer can exercise control over the
product at a distance. The two-part test suggested above creates an
incentive for the producer to maintain control and continues to allow
an innovation safe-harbor while avoiding the draconian irrelevance of
costs and missing design incentives associated with the current Sony
rule.
B. Implementing the Ongoing Design Obligation
How should we implement this ongoing design obligation? Note
one of the key virtues of this structure: this is an exercise in ex post
design, not ex ante design by committee. We should be concerned
about creating mechanisms which give a substantive or procedural
veto over new designs. Match this with the First Amendment's
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strong presumption against prior restraint: the core instinct there is
that we will too often make mistakes that block valuable speech, and
that we are better served by trying to correct matters after the fact.
The test suggested above does exactly that, as the networked product
creator will be able to exercise control over the product at a distance,
but can also release a new product immediately so long as it has sub-
stantial noninfringing uses.
The ability to exercise control after the fact is the key point that
distinguishes the networked product from the conventional product.
So, to take one prominent point of comparison, gun manufacturers
exercise little control over their products once sold. When I point a
gun at someone, Smith & Wesson can't tell whether I am doing so
illegally or legally in self-defense. In contrast, for the networked
product, the producer may be able to separate out-to filter
out-legitimate and illegitimate uses.
We have a few data points on, as it were, contested, managed de-
sign. So consider three situations: the injunction process that fol-
lowed the Ninth Circuit's first Napster decision; the approach taken
towards Internet service providers (ISPs) in Section 512 of the Copy-
right Act; and the content-control certification process occurring as
the FCC implements its broadcast-flag regime.
1. Napster H
After the original decision in Napster in the Ninth Circuit, the dis-
trict court, on remand, implemented an injunction that required Nap-
ster to take steps to block the sharing of copyrighted works. This
meant ensuring that the work didn't show up in the centralized index
that Napster presented to its users. The plaintiffs in the suit were re-
quired to give Napster notice of songs that were available in the in-
dex, and Napster was to take steps to delete those songs from the in-
dex. The subsequent appeal to the Ninth Circuit addressed exactly
how that was to be done.46 The district court had ordered Napster to
shut down until it was able to block the distribution of the copy-
righted works as to which it had already received notice: "It's not
good enough until every effort has been made to, in fact, get zero
tolerance .... [T]he standard is, to get it down to zero. 4 7
Napster is precisely the sort of networked product that I have in
mind: it was capable of substantial noninfringing uses and, as a cen-
tralized file-indexing network, Napster could continue to exercise
substantial control over its system. And indeed, the injunction proc-
46 A & M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
47 Id. at 1097 (alteration in original).
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ess is the type of product evolution that I have in mind. So how did
we do? Focus on the evolution of the filters and the interim shut-
down. The iterative process on the filters is precisely what we should
anticipate. The district court wanted to make sure that the full capa-
bilities of the Napster system were used to block transfers of noticed
copyrighted works. I confess to a certain agnosticism, so far, at least,
as to who should bear the cost of creating these filters. We could
easily imagine that the copyright holders would need to program the
filters and bring those to Napster and that Napster would have had a
duty to implement those filters. Think of this as a carriage obligation,
perhaps a duty to deliver plug-ins created by the content creators. I
don't know that I know enough to say who is better situated to pro-
duce these filters, hence the agnosticism.
It is easy to criticize the "zero tolerance" policy as articulated,
though at some level, it does nothing more than insist that the full
capabilities of the system be implemented. But zero tolerance is in-
sensitive to the cost of achieving it. The standard lore of fixes is that
you spend 10% of your effort to achieve 90% success, and 90% to get
the last 10%, be it copyright infringement on Napster or pollution air
particulates. That is why a sensible evolution duty might shift the
burden of producing filters or other changes after a few iterations.
The interim shutdown is another version of zero tolerance. Were I
a district court judge, I could imagine implementing a shutdown in
response to the perceived bad faith of Napster in implementing
changes. You can imagine foot-dragging in this process, and the
judge might have to resort to something tougher--daily fines or a
shutdown-to command full attention to the necessary changes. But
to move too quickly to shutdown will be to lose the incentive effects
of my two-part test. If a product creator retains control, they
shouldn't face an immediate shutdown merely because they can
evolve the product to minimize infringing uses.
2. ISPs and Section 512 of the Copyright Act
Section 512 of the Copyright Act was added in 1998 as part of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Section 512 addresses the poten-
tial liability for copyright infringement of Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and establishes an administrative regime to control that liabil-
ity. We can easily think of Section 512 as a jointly designed process
to control potential copyright infringement that might arise from the
services that ISPs provide to their customers.
ISPs provide a number of services. They serve as communications
conduits through which customers upload and download content.
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ISPs provide megabytes of storage space for customers and often
provide hosting services for websites maintained by customers. All
of this could put ISPs squarely in the middle of potential copyright
infringement and could expose the ISPs to direct and indirect copy-
right liability.
Of course, ISPs would prefer not to face liability for their activities
and Section 512 creates a safe-harbor for them. 48 If ISPs dot their i's
and cross their t's, they do not face liability for potential copyright
infringement for online materials that are transmitted, routed, cached
or stored on their systems.49 To get the safe harbor, however, the ISP
needs to do a number of things. First, it needs to have a policy in
place so that the ISP has a mechanism to revoke customers who are,
as the statute puts it, "repeat infringers. 5° Second, the service pro-
vider must operate a service that accommodates standard technical
measures designed to identify or protect copyrighted works. 51 Third,
for material stored by ISP customers on the ISP's computers, the stat-
ute implements what is known as the notice-and-takedown procedure.
The ISP must be set up to remove material from its system in re-
sponse to complying notices regarding alleged infringement.52 The
statute addresses possible ISP liability for taking down material and
creates a counter-notification mechanism for customers who believe
in good faith that their content was mistakenly removed.53
This is a mechanism for evolving the service to minimize copy-
right infringement. As with any safe harbor, there will be issues
about how it works. Both Napster and Aimster sought refuge in the
safe harbor, but the 7th Circuit quickly dismissed the idea that Aimster
could qualify and the 9th Circuit intimated that Napster wouldn't qual-
ify either.54
3. TiVoGuard and the Broadcast Flag
As part of the design of the new digital television system, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission has created a "broadcast flag"
architecture. The flag captures Justice Blackmun's notion in his Sony
48 As to the broad question of ISP liability, see Douglas Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding
Internet Service Providers Accountable, in THE LAW AND.ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY
(Mark Grady & Francesoco Parisi eds., forthcoming 2005).
49 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2004) (transitory digital network communications); § 512(b) (sys-
tem caching), § 512(c) (information stored by customers); § 512(d) (use of search tools).
50 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
51 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B), § 512(i)(2).
52 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
53 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
54 Respectively, In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003), and A
& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
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dissent that it might be possible for the broadcast TV signal to contain
a separate signal indicating whether the copyright holder authorized
taping the program.55 As implemented by the FCC, the broadcast flag
doesn't control copying of content but instead creates a consent re-
gime regarding the redistribution of content.56 Toggling the flag will
make it possible for the broadcaster to indicate whether it will allow
its content to be redistributed. The Broadcast Flag Order is contro-
versial57 and has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit, where the court
may reach the merits regarding the scope of the FCC's authority, but
only after the D.C. Circuit sorts through the issue of standing.
58
My concerns here, however, are not FCC authority or standing.
The Broadcast Flag Order contemplated further rulemaking about
particular technologies and how those technologies would satisfy the
redistribution control requirement. In the subsequent proceeding,
thirteen technologies were considered, including a Windows DRM
technology from Microsoft and a competing DRM approach by
RealNetworks. Most of the technologies implemented measures tied
to proximity to control redistribution. While the Internet is famous
for collapsing distance, that doesn't mean that there still aren't met-
rics for capturing "distance" over the Internet. The proximity controls
in the proceeding focused on the number of routers that a packet
could cross before it would be discarded-Time to Live or TTL-or
on establishing a cut-off time for a packet to travel between
devices-Round Trip Time or RTT (measured in milliseconds).59
55 Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,494 (1984).
56 See In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23550, 23555 (Nov. 4,
2003) ("In light of our decision to adopt a redistribution control scheme and to avoid any confu-
sion, we wish to reemphasize that our action herein in no way limits or prevents consumers from
making copies of digital broadcast television content."). On mechanisms of consent generally,
see Picker, supra note 2. Also note that although the broadcast flag doesn't implement a copy
control for broadcast TV, copy controls are implemented for basic cable and premium cable
services in the FCC's so called Plug-and-Play Order. Compatibility between Cable Systems and
Consumer Electronics Equipment, 18 F.C.C.R. 20885 (Oct 9, 2003). HBO immediately imple-
mented this system. limiting home users to one copy of its "linear" broadcasts-ordinary,
scheduled broadcasts-and barring all copying of its nonlinear, on demand programs. See HBO
FAQ page for Copyright Protection available at
http://www.hbo.com/corpinfo/cgmsafaq.shtml.
57 See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 603 (2003).
58 Robert T. Numbers II, Note, To Promote Profit in Science and the Useful Arts: The
Broadcast Flag, FCC Jurisdiction, and Copyright Implications, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439
(2004) (arguing FCC's adoption of broadcast flag exceeds its jurisdictional grant; on standing);
see also, American Library Ass'n. v. Federal Comm. Comm'n, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 4239,
(D.C. Cir. Mar 15, 2005) (ordering further briefing on standing issues). On May 6, 2005, after
this article was written, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to imple-
ment the broadcast flag. See American Library Ass'n. v. F.C.C., 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
59 See In re Digital Output Protection Technology and Recording Method Certifications,
19 F.C.C.R. 15876, 15881, 8 (Aug. 12, 2004).
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This would make it possible to share content between upstairs and
downstairs TVs, but not between a downstairs TV and a TV in Sibe-
ria.
But TiVo-makers of the digital video recorder of the same
name-instead looked to an authority-based model of control. In that
framework, TiVoGuard, as the technology is known, would define a
secure viewing group of ten devices that could share content, inde-
pendent of the distance between those devices. So that a user could
put her home TV in the same group as her Siberian summer home
TV, for example, but still place limits on the number of devices and
thus control mass redistribution.6 °
The MPAA objected to TiVoGuard, both in its then-current form,
but also as to how TiVoGuard might evolve. This is the process of
"change management," a critical question of how dynamic technology
can evolve given the FCC's duties as to technology certification.6'
The MPAA sought to have the FCC approve all changes prior to im-
plementation, which would give the FCC a powerful ex ante role in
design choices.62 Understanding that this would slow the pace of
innovation, the FCC stepped back from ex ante evaluation of non-
material changes to technology, and instead deferred to privately-
agreed-to procedures for change management. 63 But the FCC re-
tained direct control over technical changes that were "material and
substantial in nature," even in circumstances where private parties
had agreed to change management procedures. 64
This is an interesting mix of private and public ex ante review of
design choices. And matters got even more interesting in considering
the MPAA's motion for reconsideration. MPAA switched from ad-
vocating universal FCC ex ante review and instead favored having the
FCC cede ex ante review authority to the private change management
65process. In contrast, TiVo feared that private and public ex ante
review might move on different time tracks. The MPAA could gain a
modicum of control over technological change by favoring one tech-
nology over another, and that might be especially powerful if private
review moves forward faster than the FCC's public review. 66 TiVo
60 Id. at 15885-7, ][19-23.
61 Id. at 15918-21, 1 94-99.
62 Id. at 15918,[94.
63 Id. at 15920, 98.
64 Id. at 15920-1, 99.
65 See Petition for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification by the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America,, in the Matter of Digital Output Protection Technology and Recording
Method Certifications, MB Docket Nos. 04-55 to 04-68, 13 (Sept. 13, 2004); Omnibus Reply
Brief 9-10 (Oct. 5, 2004).
66 Opposition of TiVo, Inc. to the Petition for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification, In
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therefore favored all-or-nothing public review, meaning that either all
of the technologies needed to go through the same public process or
none of them did.
These three examples-the subsequent litigation about Napster af-
ter the 9th Circuit's initial decision; the notice-and-takedown structure
of Section 512 of the Copyright Act creating a safe harbor for ISPs;
and the content-protection certification process for the broadcast
flag-give a real sense of the complexities of designing rules and
administrative processes for controlling copyright infringement. This
is obviously ongoing and we are likely to see more of these in the
future, but nothing here suggests to me yet that we can't move for-
ward on managing design obligations related to copyright infringe-
ment.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of distributed storage, machine intelligence and
cheap communications has given rise to the most interesting con-
sumer products of the day-networked products. These are products
that can evolve even after versions of the product have been put into
the hands of consumers. This includes the natural successor to the
VCR-whether the plain digital video recorder or the TiVo favored
by the digerati-and the ubiquitous iPod and its less chic cousin MP3
players. This category also includes peer-to-peer software in its vari-
ous forms, whether as Napster, Aimster or Grokster.
More than twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court con-
fronted the VCR in the Sony case. The substantial noninfringing use
test has both virtues and vices. It has provided a safe harbor for prod-
uct innovation. It makes it possible for a creator to toss a product
onto the waters to see what happens, having only a vague sense of
what will happen next. But Sony also provides no reason for a creator
to design products to eliminate infringing uses.
The core fight over Sony turns precisely on the uncertainty of what
happens next: what is the next use of the product not seen today? But
Sony is framed in the context of episodic design with an installed-base
constraint and no real possibility of feedback between actual use of
the product and design. We are at a very different point now. Net-
worked products evolve and we are now going to frame what ongoing
design obligations should exist with regard to these evolving, net-
worked products.
re Digital Output Protection Technology and Recording Method Certifications, MB Docket
Nos. 04-55 to 04-68, 21 (Sept. 27, 2004).
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Once we combine software with communication to create net-
worked products we then have products that can (and do) evolve in
real-time. Smart products "phone home" and update themselves.
Phoning home-and the resulting control-is a choice, and one that
designers of networked products make every day. Design ceases to
be a one-time event and instead becomes a continuous process. And
that is true not only for the next product sold, but also for the entire
installed base. The dead hand of the past and the constraints of back-
wards compatibility are lifted.
We need to update the Sony test to reflect these possibilities. If the
producer chooses to let go of a networked product so that the pro-
ducer cannot exercise control going forward and therefore cannot
change the product in response to actual use, the producer should face
a hard use test, perhaps one tied to whether the primary use of the
product is noninfringing. If instead the producer ensures that the
product can phone home so that updates can be promulgated through-
out the system for the networked product, the producer should face a
substantial noninfringing use test, coupled with the duty to evolve the
product to eliminate infringing uses.
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